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Penumbral Thinking Revisited:
Metaphor in Legal Argumentation
J. Christopher Rideout*
The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corpo-
rations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor.
Judge Benjamin Cardozo 1
Science, not to mention everyday thought, is influenced by metaphors.
Why shouldn't law be?
Judge Richard Posner
2
[A]ll thinking... is metaphorical.
Robert Frost
3
Starting with Aristotle, the place of metaphor in human language has long
been double-edged. Metaphors are well recognized, often even recom-
mended, and yet their use is controversial and at times criticized.4
Aristotle acknowledged that metaphor was a common feature of
language,' but he also regarded metaphor as a deviation from ordinary
uses of language. 6 Accordingly, he warned that metaphors should be used
with a sense of their appropriateness for the occasion.7 On the other hand,
Aristotle pointed out that anyone who achieved the appropriate use of
metaphors might be a "master of metaphor" and, hence, exhibit the signs
of genius. Why? "[A] good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the
* © L Christopher Rideout 2010. Professor of Lawyering Skills and Associate Director of Legal Writing, Seattle University
School of Law.
1 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
2 The Problems of Jurisprudence 395 ( Harv. U. Press 1990).
3 Education by Poetry, in Collected Poems, Prose, & Plays 717, 720 ( Lib. of America 1995).
4 Aristotle commented on metaphor both in his Rhetoric and in The Poetics. See Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic
Discourse (George A. Kennedy trans., Oxford U. Press 1991) [hereinafter Aristotle, On Rhetoric]; Aristotle, The Poetics
(Ingram Bywater trans., The Modern Lib. 1954) [hereinafter Aristotle, The Poetics].
5 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, supra n. 4, at 222.
6 Aristotle, The Poetics, supra n. 4, at 254.
7 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, supra n. 4, at 222, 228.
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similarity in dissimilars 78 Aristotle, like so many to follow, found a dual
nature to metaphors: they are something to be mastered and used well-to
good or even brilliant effect-but with caution and with an understanding
of their peculiar nature.
This acknowledgement of the place for metaphor, accompanied on
the other hand by the controversy over the appropriate use of metaphor,
has extended to modern discussions of metaphor, including the place of
metaphor in legal discourse. Judge Cardozo evoked a metaphor, "the mists
of metaphor' to complain about the figure's effect on the logical clarity of
"familial" relationships in corporate law.9 In the same opinion, he warned
that although metaphors in the law can "liberate thought, they end often
by enslaving it"'10 And yet Judge Posner, recognizing the place of metaphor
in both science and in everyday thinking, notes that law can be no
exception to metaphor's influence.
In the modern jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, the
controversy over the place of metaphor came directly into the spotlight in
Griswold v. Connecticut.11 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority and
relying in part on metaphoric reasoning for his argument, located a right
to privacy in the penumbral area formed by emanations from specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 12 Just as confidently, in his concurrence,
Justice Harlan found that an inquiry into a right to privacy could not
depend on any metaphorical radiations from the Bill of Rights. 3 Justice
Black, admonishing the Court for not sticking to the simple language of
the Constitution, advised that he could "get nowhere in this case by talk
about a constitutional 'right of privacy' as an emanation from one or more
constitutional provisions" 14 And Justice Stewart flatly rejected the idea of
finding any general right to privacy, penumbral or otherwise, whether in
the text of the Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, or in any case decided by
the Court."5 Justice Stewart was no doubt predisposed to his lack of
sympathy for Justice Douglas's penumbra metaphor. Three years earlier, he
had rejected outright another metaphorical usage by the Court, asserting
that the "wall of separation" between church and state was a phrase
8 Aristotle, The Poetics, supra n. 4, at 
2
55.
9 Berkey, 155 N.E. at 61.
10 Id
11 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12 Id. at 484.
13 See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan does offer a non-metaphorical analysis, employing the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. See also Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of
Constitutional Rights, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 623, 668 (2006).
14 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 509-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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"nowhere to be found in the Constitution ' 16 Metaphorical penumbras
hardly fared any better than metaphorical walls with Justice Stewart.
The various opinions in Griswold represent a divide, then, regarding
the place of metaphoric reasoning in legal argument. Justice Douglas
employs metaphoric reasoning, while several of his fellow justices either
avoid it or reject it. Because the case has been pivotal in establishing a
right to privacy, this division about the Court's use of metaphoric
reasoning has extended into the many commentaries on the case. 7
Somewhat ironically, at about the same time that a number of
commentators began to analyze, and disagree about, Douglas's use of the
penumbra metaphor, another group of thinkers began reexamining the
place of metaphor altogether, both in language and in thought. This latter
group asserted not only that metaphor was a common and ordinary
feature of language, but that metaphor was also central to human
thinking-part of the very stuff of thought.1 8 For them, metaphor is
conceptual, and it lies at the heart of how we understand the world. At the
level of thought, we can hardly avoid using metaphor.
Why has Douglas's penumbra metaphor created such a stir?19 Despite
the contemporary views regarding metaphor, one possibility is that
Douglas organized his opinion around a metaphor. As this article will
discuss below, metaphors have a long history of being viewed with
suspicion, or of being regarded as untrue. No doubt part of the criticism of
Douglas's metaphor has to do with this general distrust of metaphor, but
16 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445-46 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
17 See e.g. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica: The Political Seduction of the Law 99 (Free Press 1990); Brannon P.
Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 1089 (1997); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 929 n. 69 (1973); David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a
Right, 34 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Liberties L. Rev. 7 (1999); Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1333 (1992); Mark Tushnet, Two Notes on the Jurisprudence ofPrivacy, 8 Const. Commentary 75, 75-80 (1991); Harry
H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 221,
292 94(1973).
18 Most prominent in this area of research is the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. See Mark Johnson, The Body in
the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (U. Chi. Press 1987); George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and
Dangerous Things: What Categories RevealAbout the Mind (U. Chi. Press 1987) [hereinafter Categories]; George Lakoff, The
Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in Metaphor and Thought 202 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed., Cambridge U. Press 1993)
[hereinafter Theory]; George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to
Western Thought (Basic Books 1999) [hereinafter Philosophy]; George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (U. Chi.
Press 1980) [hereinafter Metaphors]; George Lakoff & Mark Turner, More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic
Metaphor (U. Chi. Press 1989). Among the work in metaphoric reasoning in legal discourse, see the writings of Steven L.
Winter, including A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind (U. Chi. Press 2001) [hereinafter Clearing]; Re-Embodying
Law, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 869 (2007) [hereinafter Re-Embodying]; Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the
Cognitive Stakesfor Law, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105 (1989) [hereinafter Transcendental Nonsense]; and The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371 (1988). On metaphor as "the stuff of thought; see Steven
Pinker, The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature 235-78 (Viking 2007).
19 The opinion also became the focus of an ideological controversy. For one of many discussions of this controversy, see
Luban, supra n. 17. This article will deal with questions about Douglas's metaphorical usage.
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that does not fully explain the uneasiness with the penumbra metaphor in
Griswold. Other Supreme Court justices have built their opinions around
a central organizing metaphorical concept without calling such attention
to their metaphorical usage.
20
Another possibility is that Douglas's metaphor is overly novel-that
he simply invented it, fancifully, to arrive at his desired result. But Douglas
was not the first judge to use the penumbra metaphor, and historical and
precedential evidence exists that Douglas's penumbra metaphor accords
with an established line of usage.
21
Yet another possibility is that the objections are triggered not by the
fact that Douglas used a metaphor in his reasoning, but rather by how he
used that metaphor. The conceptual soundness of Douglas's use of the
penumbra metaphor in Griswold has been called into question by several
earlier authors.2 2 It may be that metaphors have some unspoken "rules" for
usage and that Douglas violated some of them. Aristotle hints at this when
he indicates that mastery of metaphors is a sign of genius. But Aristotle
never offers clear guidelines for achieving that mastery.
This article takes a step in that direction, by revisiting and further
exploring some of the ways in which metaphors work. Starting with
classical rhetoric, metaphors have traditionally been regarded as a matter
of style, but recent research indicates that their role in our understanding
of the world lies much deeper. Metaphors work through complex systems
of correspondences, involving the mapping of conceptual domains onto
each other and relying on the entailments that arise from that mapping.
The "rules" for metaphorical usage, then, no doubt run deep as well-into
this mapping and its coherence.
If such unspoken "rules" for metaphorical usage exist, then Douglas
may have violated some of them with his penumbra metaphor-sound as
his conceptual use of the metaphor may have been in other respects.
Understanding the strengths, and perhaps the shortcomings, of the
penumbra metaphor, then, can be a way of learning how to use
metaphoric reasoning effectively in legal argument. That understanding of
20 For a study of some of the more prominent ones, see Haig Bosmajian, Metaphor and Reason in Judicial Opinions (S. Il. U.
Press 1992).
21 Two earlier articles have traced this line of usage by the Court. See Henry T. Greely, A Footnote to "Penumbra" in Griswold
v. Connecticut, 6 Const. Commentary 251 (1989); Burr Henly, "Penumbra'" The Roots ofa Legal Metaphor, 15 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 81 (1987). This article retraces the line of usage noted by Henly in particular. Henly offered a convincing
argument that the penumbra metaphor fit within a well- established line of usage, but he left somewhat unanswered the
questions that he raised about the rhetorical effectiveness of the metaphor. Turning to more recent work on the cognitive
bases for metaphor, this article updates the Henly discussion and offers some answers regarding the rhetorical effectiveness
of Douglas's penumbra metaphor.
22 See Henly, supra n. 21, at 96 99; Richard D. Mohr, Mr. Justice Douglas at Sodom: Gays and Privacy, 18 Colum. Hum.
Rights L. Rev. 43, 62 (1986); Luban, supra n. 17, at 32; Kanter, supra n. 13, at 640-711; Greely, supra n. 21, at 251.
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the penumbra metaphor must begin, however, with some theoretical
understanding of how metaphors work.
I. The Great Divide: Metaphors as Deviation
and Metaphors as Fundamental
Like many of the terms used in classical Greek rhetoric, the word
"metaphor" is itself a metaphor,23 taken from the Greek verb "meta-
pherein;' meaning "to transfer. 2 4 The transference involves giving one
thing a name that belongs to something else.2" Empedocles, a 5th century
B.C. philosopher and orator who taught the noted rhetorician Gorgias,
may have been the first to become known for his conscious, deliberate use
of metaphor.2 6 Aristotle took note of this usage, additionally commenting
that Empedocles was the first to discover rhetoric.2 7 Argumentative use of
metaphors goes back a long way.
In his own Rhetoric, Aristotle introduced metaphor in Book 3, the
section of the treatise that deals with prose style. That he did so is fitting.
For Aristotle, as for the rest of the classical commentators on rhetoric,
metaphor was largely a matter of style. For the Rhetoric, Aristotle appears
to have adopted the definition of metaphor that he also presented in the
Poetics, his one other work that discusses the topic.2 8 Indeed, in Section
3.2 of the Rhetoric, Aristotle sets metaphor apart from some of the other
stylistic devices as being poetic. But he also terms metaphor one of the
most useful of the stylistic devices because of its ability to make what is
said seem unusual, and thus more striking.29
After introducing metaphor in Section 3.2, Aristotle resumed his
discussion in Section 3.12. Regarding prose style, Aristotle valued clarity
above all else, but viewed distinction of style as also very important. For
this reason, metaphor was, in his opinion, especially valuable because, of
the poetic devices that lent both clarity and distinction, metaphor was the
only poetic device available to the writer of prose.30
23 See George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric 5
9 
(Princeton U. Press 1994).
24 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1756 (Lesley Brown ed., Oxford 1993).
25 See Aristotle, Poetics, supra n. 4, at 251.
26 See Kennedy, supra n. 23, at 18. Empedocles was active in Sicilian political life in the earlier 5th century B.C. and, in the
process, acquired a reputation as a skilled orator.
27 Id. at 18. See also Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language
10 (Robert Czerny trans., U. Toronto Press 1977).
28 See Ricoeur, supra n. 27, at 13.
29 See Kennedy, supra n. 23, at 59.
30 See George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times 78 (U.
North Carolina Press 1980).
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The other major classical commentators on rhetoric followed
Aristotle's lead, all of them discussing the stylistic uses of metaphor,
including its uses in forensic persuasion:
31 Cicero in De Oratore,3 2
Quintilian in Institutio Oratoria,33 and the anonymous author of the
Rhetorica ad Herennium.34 Like Aristotle, these commentators gave
stylistic reasons for the usefulness of metaphors, regarding them as helpful
to explanation, description, or persuasion, 35 or as being concise or
subtle.36 Cicero noted that metaphors are pleasurable because they suggest
a wholeness of insight, or a picture of the whole thing.
37
Underlying all the classical discussions of metaphor, however, was the
assumption that metaphor is a matter of language, not of thought.38 And,
as a matter of language, metaphorical expressions were viewed as being
novel or poetic-a way of taking the words for one concept outside of their
ordinary conventional meaning in order to make a statement about a
similar concept.39 The subsequent treatment of metaphor, not only among
the classical rhetoricians but for the centuries to follow, extends this
assumption, 40 as does the consequent status accorded to metaphors:
metaphors were regarded as a deviation from ordinary language. They
were regarded as figures of speech, rather than as structures of thought.
Both of these views have survived to the present and thus warrant further
examination.
A. Classical Rhetorical Theory: Metaphors as Deviation
from Ordinary Language
In the opening sentence of their ground-breaking book on metaphor,
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson note how the classical assumptions
about metaphor have continued to the present:
41
31 For further discussion of the forensic uses of metaphor by the classical rhetoricians, see Michael H. Frost, Greco-Roman
Analysis of Metaphoric Reasoning, in Introduction to Classical Legal Rhetoric 85 (Ashgate Publg. 2005).
32 Cicero, De Oratore (EW. Sutton & H. Rackman trans., Harv. U. Press 1942).
33 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria vol. 3, (H. E. Butler trans., Harv. U. Press 1921).
34 Rhetorica adHerennium (H. Caplan trans., Harv. U. Press 1954).
35 See Frost, supra n. 31, at 85. Frost notes that the classical rhetoricians also valued them for their reliance on metaphoric
reasoning, but I do not think he is employing the term in the same way that this article does. See id.
36 See id. at 88.
37 See id. at 88, 104.
38 See Lakoff, Theory, supra n. 18, at 202.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 In his later article, Lakoff notes that the classical theory of metaphor, which he terms a theory only, became definitional
for metaphor. See id.
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Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the
rhetorical flourish-a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary
language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of
language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this
reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without
metaphor.
42
Aristotle first set the stage, most fully in his Poetics, for viewing
metaphor as extraordinary or deviant. There, after defining metaphor as
the giving of the name of one thing to another, he terms the transposed
name allotrios-"the alien name' '43 The original name he terms "ordinary"
or kurion-"current"-the name used generally, or in general usage. 44 He
then defines metaphor as deviant-para to kurion. 4 Aristotle did not
regard metaphor's deviation from ordinary usage as a problem. On the
contrary, the deviation lent metaphor a certain distinctiveness, as a conse-
quence of its strangeness. Using a metaphor was a way of going beyond
the prosaic in one's style,46 and in this way the deviation itself could lend
clarity.
47
Aristotle's definition of metaphor as a deviation also sets up what has
later been called the substitution theory of metaphor: that the metaphor is
a substitute for the ordinary or literal meaning.48 The substitution, and the
displacement of meaning, is double. The metaphorical term is, first, a
borrowed word and, second, a substitute for an ordinary way of expressing
the same thing.4 9 The substitution theory of metaphor, and its opposition
between the extraordinary or deviant meaning of a metaphor and the
ordinary meaning for which it substitutes, has a long history. Quintilian,
for example, described metaphors as "a purposeful deviation in sense or
language from the ordinary simple form... [or] that which is poetically or
42 Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors, supra n. 18, at 3.









48 See Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy 31-32 (Cornell U. Press 1962).
49 See Ricoeur, supra n. 27, at 19. According to Max Black, when the metaphorical expression calls explicit attention to the
comparison between its terms, as in a simile (using the word "like" or "as" to express the comparison), then that metaphorical
expression exhibits a special form of the substitution theory of metaphor called the "comparison view See Black, supra n. 48,
at 35-37. Black calls this view of metaphor the most popular one. Most people regard metaphor as a comparison between
two things, and they have the easiest time expressing the comparison as a simile. See id.; see also Ricoeur, supra n. 27, at
85 87. Even in the comparison view, however, the metaphorical expression is a substitute for an ordinary way of stating the
same thing.
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rhetorically varied from the simple and immediately available means of
expression '5 0
The idea of metaphor as deviant survives well into the present. In his
handbook of rhetorical terms, Richard Lanham, a respected modern
commentator on rhetoric, defines metaphor as "[c]hanging a word from
its literal meaning to one not properly applicable but analogous to it""1 and
notes how commentators have treated metaphor as a special case in the
relationship between words and meaning.5 2 Like Aristotle, he then uses
this extraordinary status of metaphorical language to suggest its attrac-
tiveness, although in modern terms:
Perhaps it is metaphor's intrinsic instability that has attracted so much
recent attention: to appreciate the metaphoricality of a metaphor we
must posit a nonmetaphorical, normative 'reality' against which to
project the metaphorical transformation. The oscillation of the two
reality states, normative and transformative, provides the essential
bounded instability of a bistable illusion.
5 3
Nevertheless, metaphor remains deviant and opposed to the "normal'
Indeed, even though metaphor's deviation from ordinary language lent it a
usefulness and a striking effect, this effect was regarded as only stylistic
and had the consequence as well of relegating metaphor to a secondary
linguistic status-a stylistic fiction, made in necessary opposition to any
truthful statement about reality.
As Lakoff and Johnson point out, the idea that metaphors lack truth-
fulness has engendered a long history of resistance to them, starting with
Plato and his Allegory of the Cave.5 4 In Plato's allegory, truth is absolute
and art a mere illusion. Metaphors, being poetic and extraordinary
features of language, belonged to the realm of art. Aristotle, who praised
metaphors for their ability to lend something of the poetic to prose, inad-
vertently also condemned them to the status of the secondary. This
suspicion of metaphors continued into the modern period in Western
civilization. Hobbes regarded metaphors as absurd and misleadingly
emotional.5 5 Locke, relegating metaphors to the "deceitful" realm of
50 Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on
Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 949, 954 (2007) (quoting Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, vol. 4, bk. I, 10-14).
51 Richard A. Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms 100 (2d ed., U. Cal. Press 1991). See also Encyclopedia of Rhetoric 493
(Thomas 0. Sloane ed., Oxford U. Press 2001) (defining metaphor as a "substitution of similarities").
52 Lanham, supra n. 51, at 100-01.
53 Id. at 101 (internal emphasis omitted).
54 See Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors, supra n. 18, at 190.
55 See id.
PENUMBRAL THINKING REVISITED
rhetoric, noted that their use could insinuate "wrong ideas" and "mislead
the judgment"5 6 This continuing criticism of metaphor as a "deviation
from [the] normal mode" of language did, however, open the way for a
later reevaluation of its place. 7
B. Classical Rhetorical Theory: Metaphors as Stylistic Ornament
For the classical rhetoricians, metaphor was additionally the dress of
thought rather than the stuff of thought. That is, metaphor was a stylistic
figure of speech, but only that. 8 Again, Aristotle set the stage with his
definition of metaphor as being a deviation from ordinary language usage.
The idea of metaphor as a figure of speech is a corollary to the idea of
metaphor as deviation. If metaphor is a deviation from ordinary usage,
and if ordinary usage is proper usage, then metaphor is also a deviation
from proper usage. This logical progression sets up the distinction
between literal meanings and figurative meanings. Metaphor, being a
deviation from proper usage, must always only be a figure of speech. 9
As a figure of speech, rather than an ordinary statement about reality,
metaphor also can only be an ornament. Quintilian called metaphor an
"ornament of oratory"60 and, in forensic discourse, the "supreme
ornament."'61 Later thinkers continued this classical tradition of viewing
metaphor as mere linguistic ornament: for example, Hobbes, 62 Samuel
Johnson, 63 and Lord Mansfield.
64
Ricoeur further argues that metaphor's treatment as an ornamental
figure of speech follows from its grounding in a classical substitution
theory of metaphor:
56 See id. at 190-91.
57 See I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric 90 (Oxford U. Press 1936). This article will turn to this re-evaluation in
Section C below.
58 Technically, the classical rhetoricians would have called metaphor a trope (because it generally involves only a single word,
unlike a figure, which would involve two or more words). But this distinction, first propounded by the Stoics, was lost on
many classical commentators on rhetoric. See Kennedy, supra n. 23, at 91-92.
59 See Ricoeur, supra n. 27, at 19. The step appears to have been taken by later rhetoricians; no evidence exists that Aristotle
himself explicitly tried to establish metaphor as a figure only.
60 Frost, supra n. 31, at 90 (quoting Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, vol. 3, 253). 1 should note that Frost offers an argument
that the classical rhetoricians saw metaphors as useful not only as stylistic figures, but for a form of metaphoric reasoning.
Frost's use of the term "metaphoric reasoning" seems different from the way it is used by contemporary theorists of
metaphor.
61 Id. at 87 (quoting Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, vol. 3, 199).
62 See David T. Ritchie, Who is on the Outside Looking In, and What Do They See?? Metaphors of Exclusion in Legal
Education, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 991 (2007) (citing Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Pt. I, Ch. 4 (John Plameatz ed., Prometheus
Books 1962)).
63 See Richards, supra n. 57, at 93.
64 See Ritchie, supra n. 62, at 992.
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It is the idea of substitution that appears to bear the greatest conse-
quences: for if the metaphorical term is really a substituted term, it
carries no new information, since the absent term (if one exists) can be
brought back in; and if there is no information conveyed, then metaphor
has only an ornamental, decorative value. These two consequences of a
purely substitutive theory characterize the treatment of metaphor in
classical rhetoric.
65
Because metaphor has so commonly been viewed as a figure of
speech and a matter of style, many writing treatises follow the lead of
Aristotle in commenting on its stylistic uses, including treatises on writing
for the law. These commentaries almost always come with cautions as
well. Henry Weihofen warns that metaphors, like all figures of speech,
must be used with restraint.66 He also appears to have implicitly adopted
Aristotle's substitution view of metaphor-which conceives of metaphor
as another way of stating the same thing. "Lawyers write for persons who
can usually understand a metaphor.... But... [ask] whether the reader is
likely to misunderstand your reference. If there is any danger that he may,
better make it clearer"67 "Clearer" would presumably be in ordinary, non-
figurative language. Even Bryan Garner is cautious in his advice about
metaphors, citing them as a cause of purple prose and admitting that
"[f]igures of speech can be extremely effective, but only when sparingly
used " 68 This kind of advice is not without warrant, but nevertheless is
better understood in the context of a more fully developed theory of
metaphor, as will be demonstrated below.
C. Modern Theories of Metaphor: Thought, not Language
Modern theories of metaphor turn the classical hierarchy upside down.
Metaphor, far from being a matter of language and style, is instead a
matter of thought. And rather than belonging to the realm of the extraor-
dinary, metaphors are in fact ordinary, a central part of our everyday lives.
The very way in which we think, "our ordinary conceptual system... is
fundamentally metaphorical in nature 69 Lakoff calls the classical theory
of metaphor just that-a theory.
As a cognitive scientist and a linguist, one asks: what are the general-
izations governing the linguistic expressions referred to classically as
'poetic metaphors?' When this question is answered rigorously, the
65 Ricoeur, supra n. 27, at 20. 67 Id.
66 Henry Weihofen, Legal Writing Style 119 (2d ed., West 68 Bryan A. Garner, The Elements of Legal Style 196 (Oxford
1980). U. Press 1991).
69 Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors, supra n. 18, at 3.
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classical theory turns out to be false. The generalizations governing
poetic metaphorical expressions are not in language, but in thought: they
are general mappings across conceptual domains.
70
Metaphor, in the view of Lakoff and others, offers a way to understand
how we conceptualize the world. We do so by mapping some of the
features of one domain onto another domain, what is often termed "cross-
domain mapping 7 1
Central to the modern theory of metaphor is the understanding that
cross-domain mapping occurs at the level of thought, not language. This
understanding, in turn, makes it important to distinguish between the
metaphor itself-a conceptual matter, occurring at the level of thought-
and the words that express the metaphor, better referred to as the
"metaphorical expression. '"2 Thus, according to this view, the language of
the metaphor, the metaphorical expression on which the classical
rhetoricians had focused their attention, is merely the surface manifes-
tation of the underlying conceptual metaphor.
73
Our very language reveals the underlying metaphorical structures
that organize our thoughts. One often-cited example, relevant to law, is
the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. In this metaphor, the domain
of WAR is mapped onto the domain of ARGUMENT, as revealed in our
common ways of talking about argument:
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weakpoint in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I've never won an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.
He shot down all of my arguments.
74
According to modern theories of metaphor, these statements about
argument as war are not only figures of speech or matters of linguistic
expression, but also ways of understanding argument by means of the
mapping of some of the features of war (physical attack, strategy, victory
70 Lakoff, Theory, supra n. 18, at 202 03.
71 See id. at 203.
72 Id. See also I.A. Richards, who observed that metaphor in language is a matter of "explicit verbal metaphors" that are
super-imposed upon underlying conceptual metaphors. Richards, supra n. 57, at 108-09.
73 See Lakoff, Theory, supra n. 18, at 244.
74 Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors, supra n. 18, at 4.
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and defeat) onto it. The metaphorical structure and its mapping are
fundamental to how we understand argument.
A modern view of metaphor is the obverse of classical theories of
metaphor, then. Metaphors are ordinary, not extraordinary, and
conceptual, not ornamental. The nuances of metaphor, understood in
light of these two features of contemporary theory, may in turn provide
helpful insights into how metaphors work in legal argumentation.
1. Modern Theory: Metaphors as Ordinary and Fundamental
The first feature of contemporary theory, that metaphors are ordinary,
found full statement in the 1930s, with the work of I.A. Richards.
7
Richards criticized the idea that metaphor was "something special and
exceptional" in the use of language,76 declaring instead that metaphor was
the "omnipresent principle of language."77 In his view, it was not possible
to use language without using metaphor. Richards had strong words
regarding the traditional view of metaphor, which he regarded as super-
ficial:
78
The traditional theory noticed only a few of the modes of metaphor; and
limited its application of the term metaphor to a few of them only. And
thereby it made metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and
displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a borrowing between
and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts.
79
In Richards's view, meaning is always contextual, a claim that he used
to debunk the notion of metaphor as a deviation from proper usage. The
meaning of words derives not from their unitary attachment to an idea for
which they stand, but rather from their attachment to the full context
within which that idea resides. Any use of language, whether a
metaphorical expression or otherwise, is an abridgement of that fuller
context. Thus, constancy of meaning, a favored argument for those who
viewed metaphor as a deviation from ordinary language use, is "never
anything but the constancy of contexts. 80 Metaphors obey this same
principle of contexts, and the constancy of meaning-being contextual,
not lexical-applies to them perhaps even more than to words alone.
Richards further derided as a form of magical thinking the idea that
certain forms of language usage, but not others, would be proper, ordinary,
75 See Richards, supra n. 57. On the centrality of Richards 77 Id. at 92.
to modern metaphorical theory, see Berger, supra n. 50, at 78 See id. at 98 112.
955.
79 Id. at 94 (italics in original).
76 Richards, supra n. 57, 
at 90.
80 See Ricoeur, supra n. 27, at 78.
PENUMBRAL THINKING REVISITED
and attached to the true meaning of those words. 81 Far from being a
divergent principle for how language works, metaphor is the constitutive
form of language and the very principle by which language operates. 82
Richards also based his understanding of metaphor on the idea of
interaction: "when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different
things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose
meaning is a resultant of their interaction" 83 Later theorists have adopted
this final term, interaction, to characterize any modern theory of
metaphor as an interaction theory.84 The interaction theory of metaphor is
important in two ways. First, it moves metaphor away from the idea of
comparison, and toward a view in which one system or domain is a "lens"
for understanding another.8 And second, interaction theory replaces
substitution theory as the account of how we arrive at metaphorical
meaning. 86 In doing so, interaction theory moves metaphor away from the
realm of the extraordinary or deviant- something capable of being
restated more literally (i.e., capable of being restated by that for which it is
a substitution)-and into the realm of the cognitive.
To describe more fully the interaction of metaphor, Richards
introduced terms for the two parts (or domains) of a metaphor. The
principal subject, or original idea, of the metaphor he called the "tenor";
87
and the figure, or what is often regarded as the source of the metaphorical
transference that carries over, he called the "vehicle ' 88 In the metaphorical
expression "the fog of war,' war is the tenor and fog is the vehicle.
Understanding the nature of the relationship between these two terms,
tenor and vehicle, is central to an interaction theory of metaphor. Richards
noted that "in many of the most important uses of metaphor, the co-
presence of the vehicle and tenor results in a meaning (to be clearly
distinguished from the tenor) which is not attainable without their inter-
action' 89 The relationship between the tenor and the vehicle is larger than
81 See id.
82 See id. at 80.
83 Richards, supra n. 57, at 93.
84 See e.g. Black, supra n. 48, at 38-44; Ricoeur, supra n. 27, at 65-66; James E. Murray, Understanding Law as Metaphor, 34
J. Leg. Educ. 714, 715 (1984). Murray describes yet another theory (a second modern theory), the "tension" theory. See id. at
715-16. Other theorists treat tension-between the two domains of the metaphor-as a feature of interaction theory. See e.g.
Ricoeur, supra n. 27, at 247.
85 Berger, supra n. 50, at 955 (citing Black, supra n. 48, at 41).
86 See Ricoeur, supra n. 27, at 88.
87 Richards, supra n. 57, at 97.
88 Id. Richards himself describes the vehicle as a "figure;' but he quickly points out that he does not mean the word "figure"
in the superficial sense in which it has traditionally been applied to metaphor. See id. at 97 98. As will be seen below, this
application of the vehicle to the tenor has more recently been referred to as "cross-domain mapping:'
89 d. at 100.
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simply the meaning of the tenor plus that of the vehicle.90 And this rela-
tionship, or interaction, is part of what distinguishes metaphor from
analogy. With metaphor, the whole can be greater than the sum of its
parts, unlike for analogy, as Richards points out: "[T]here is no whole to
any analogy, we use as much of it as we need; and, if we tactlessly take any
analogy too far, we break it down. There are no such limits to the relations
of tenor and vehicle....91
As mentioned earlier, this interaction between tenor and vehicle has
more recently been called "cross-domain mapping.' 92 It also results in
what is referred to as the "entailment" of a metaphor.93 The mapping of
some features of the vehicle onto the tenor "entails" certain metaphorical
meanings. Black noted that "[i]n this 'connection' resides the secret and
the mystery of metaphor. To speak of the 'interaction' of two thoughts
'active together' . . . is to use a metaphor emphasizing the dynamic aspects
of a good reader's response... 1,94 Hence the metaphorical expression "the
fog of war" entails, among other things, that in times of battle things can
be hazy and indistinct, seeing clearly is difficult, and thus-by extension-
sound judgment can be elusive. Berger calls the interaction, or mapping, of
metaphors "cognitively efficient" and relies on it to compare metaphor to
other cognitive schemes that make a concept meaningful: schemata,
analogies, and narratives. 9 Cross-domain mapping, and its entailments, is
also central not only to a cognitive theory of metaphor, but also to an
understanding of "penumbral reasoning;' the investigation of this article.
For these reasons, we will return to the idea of entailment several more
times below.
2. Modern Theory: Metaphors as Conceptual
The second central feature of the modern theory of metaphor is that
metaphors are conceptual. This is the claim of the leading modern
theorists on metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson:
96
[M]etaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words....
[O]n the contrary, human thought processes are largely metaphorical.
This is what we mean when we say that the human conceptual system is
metaphorically structured and defined. Metaphors as linguistic
expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a
person's conceptual system.
97
90 Id. at 134. 94 Black, supra n. 48, at 39 (internal emphasis omitted).
91 Id, at 133. 95 Berger, supra n. 50, at 956.
92 See Lakoff, Theory, supra n. 18, at 203. 96 See Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors, supra n. 18, at 3.
93 See e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors, supra n. 18, at 152. 97 Id. at 6 (internal emphasis omitted).
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The very way in which we think depends on metaphors. If metaphors
are fundamental to how we think, that is because they are deeply
embedded into the way in which we understand the world. This
embedding takes place through "long, constant, and unconscious expe-
rience " 98 Part of the embedding occurs through our physical experience of
the world, and part of it occurs through our shared cultural experience of
the world. 99 Lakoff and Mark Turner (another co-author) write that we
could call metaphors "commonplace models" because they derive in part
from our shared experience of the world, or we could call them "cultural
models" because they derive in part from our cultural knowledge. 00 Either
way, as part of our conceptual system, they are cognitive models.
Many people, most notably Steven Winter, have observed that, if
metaphor is central to how we reason in general, then it must also be
central to legal reasoning.101 In a symposium exploring the role of
metaphor in law, Ritchie writes that "metaphors in legal discourse are
fundamental to the way we understand and use legal concepts" and are a
"fundamental... way of forming and expressing our intellectual imagi-
nation in the context of legal reasoning and communication."102 In the
same symposium, Johnson writes that a cognitive science of the law, based
on a modern theory of metaphor, has great potential for transforming
legal theory.103 As this article will argue, it also has potential for helping to
understand legal theory.
1 04
As mentioned earlier, the conceptual system of metaphor relies upon
an understanding of one domain in terms of another, an understanding
that relies upon the mapping of the one onto the other.10 The mapping is
based on conceptual correspondences, not superficial similarities or
comparisons.10 6 These conceptual correspondences operate like other
cognitive schemas: we use them largely unconsciously and, because of
their power, effortlessly. 0 7 And the conceptual mapping itself is the
metaphor; the linguistic form of that mapping is the metaphorical
98 Berger, supra n. 50, at 956 (citing Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy, supra n. 18, at 47).
99 See id.
100 Lakoff & Turner, supra n. 18, at 67.
101 See generally Winter, Clearing, supra n. 18.
102 Ritchie, supra n. 62, at 993-94.
103 See Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metapho, Law, 5
8 
Mercer L. Rev. 
84
5 (2007).
104 For an application of cognitive metaphor theory to legal advocacy, see Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of a
Corporation SpeakingHow the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ALWD 169 (2004).
105 See Lakoff, Theory, supra n. 18, at 204.
106 See id. at 207.
107 Lakoff & Turner, supra n. 18, at 65 66. It is possible, in most instances, to make them conscious if we so choose.
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expression. 10 8 Lakoff uses the terms "target domain" and "source domain"
in place of Richards's "tenor" and "vehicle" as the terms for the two sites of
the mapping. 0 9 And as mentioned earlier, Lakoff, like others, notes the
"entailment" that is associated with "cross-domain mapping:'
The mapping borrows the language of the source domain (the vehicle)
but, more importantly, it borrows the inference patterns of the source
domain as a way of understanding the target domain (the tenor).' 10 Each
mapping-that is, each metaphor-relies upon a fixed pattern of
conceptual correspondences that extends across the domains.111 The
patterns for the mapping are often conventionalized. 12 This convention-
alized knowledge is usually rich and well established cognitively, which is
why metaphors can seem so innate, powerful, and persuasive.113 The
mappings also preserve the cognitive structure of the source domain (or,
what Lakoff also terms the "image-schema" structure of the source
domain), but in a way that is consistent with the inherent structure of the
target domain.' 14 The mapping (and the metaphor) work only if there are
correspondences between our knowledge of the highlighted features of the
source domain and our knowledge of the corresponding typical features of
the target domain.
15
In all of these ways, metaphor obeys deeply engrained cognitive rules
of usage, and thus not every expression will be a successful instance of
metaphor. "The flames of passion" is a metaphor-and metaphorical
expression-that works;1 16 "the green beans of passion" does not. The
mapping, then, depends not only upon our embedded understandings of
the world-whether experiential or cultural-but also upon a certain
structural topology for the inference patterns.
The "internal systematicity" of metaphorical mapping and its
entailment is important for the coherence of the metaphor.117 Any
mapping will induce a set of structural similarities between the two
108 See Lakoff, Theory, supra n. 18, at 209.
109 Id. at 207. Black used his own terms, "principal" subject and "subsidiary" subject. See Black, supra n. 48, at 44. Ricoeur
rejected any use of the term "principal subject" or of "original idea" for the tenor, citing the potential implication that the
second term might then be a deviance from ordinary usage or meaning. Ricoeur, supra n. 27, at 80-81.
110 See Lakoff, Theory, supra n. 18, at 208. These inference patterns borrowed from the source domain are the heart of what
could be called "metaphorical reasoning' See Lakoff& Turner, supra n. 18, at 65.
111 See Lakoff, Theory, supra n. 18, at 210.
112 But not always so hence the potential for new metaphors. See id. at 211.
113 See Lakoff & Turner, supra n. 18, at 60-63.
114 Lakoff, Theory, supra n. 18, at 215.
115 See Lakoff & Turner, supra n. 18, at 39.
116 The metaphorical expression itself is also highly conventionalized and familiar.
117 See Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors, supra n. 18, at 91.
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domains of the metaphor, and those similarities will give rise to potential
entailments. 118 The target domain, through those structural similarities,
will fit at least some of the potential entailments. In this way, the
entailment of any metaphor achieves a kind of metaphorical coherence. In
addition to this internal metaphorical coherence, metaphors can also be
coherent among each other: if they are all special cases of the same general
or underlying metaphor; if they all map onto the same target domain; or if
they have the same grounding in everyday experience or cultural
knowledge.1 19 The coherence of metaphors is another example of their
underlying cognitive rules of usage and, like entailments, will become
important when we look at Justice Douglas's penumbra metaphor.
II. Penumbral Reasoning
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, one of the most prominent
metaphorical expressions in a modern United States Supreme Court
opinion occurs in Griswold v. Connecticut, where Justice Douglas located a
right to privacy in the penumbral area formed by emanations from the Bill
of Rights. 120 Justice Douglas's invocation of the penumbra metaphor
triggered controversy, some of it only lukewarm but some of it outwardly
critical of his reasoning.121 The case even became the focus of an ideo-
logical dispute. Some liberals, who may have agreed with Douglas's
outcome, nevertheless were uncomfortable with his methodology.122 And
some conservatives, outwardly critical of both the methodology and the
outcome, regarded the opinion as an unprincipled example of results-
oriented jurisprudence.123
Other commentators have come to the defense of Justice Douglas's
reasoning, however, citing it as an example of "penumbral reasoning" 12 4 In
their view, Justice Douglas used a form of reasoning that the court has
used many times, including in some of its earliest cases. As Denning and
118 See id. at 149 52.
119 See Lakoff & Turner, supra n. 18, at 88-89.
120 Michael Smith would categorize Douglas's "penumbra" metaphor as a "legal method" metaphor part of the process of
legal analysis by which Douglas created the doctrinal right to privacy. As such, it is distinct from a "doctrinal" metaphor-a
legal rule and a "stylistic" metaphor. See Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58 Mercer L. Rev.
919 (2007).
121 See Reynolds, supra n. 17, at 1336.
122 See e.g. Ely, supra n. 17, at 929; Wellington, supra n. 17, at 292 94.
123 Most prominently, Judge Robert Bork. See Bork, supra n. 17, at 187-221; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 8 (1971).
124 See Reynolds, supra n. 17, at 1333; Denning & Reynolds, supra n. 17, at 1090.
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Reynolds note, penumbral reasoning involves "reasoning-by-interpo-
lation," a matter of "drawing logical inferences by looking at relevant parts
of the Constitution as a whole and their relationship to one another '12 In
their view, Griswold offers a standard example of penumbral reasoning:
Justice Douglas looked at various provisions of the Bill of Rights,
including those that protect assembly, freedom from self-incrimination,
and the right not to have troops quartered in one's home. From his
survey, he inferred that there was a common thread throughout that
government could not intrude into the privacy of individuals absent
fairly compelling circumstances) 
26
Douglas found the common thread in the overlap of penumbras from
the enumerated rights.
12 7
But Griswold is only one of many examples of penumbral reasoning
by the Court. Denning and Reynolds point to McCulloch v. Maryland1 28 as
perhaps the "quintessential" example of penumbral reasoning.1 29 In that
case, Justice Marshall, like Justice Douglas, reasoned from the text and
structure of the Constitution and supplemented his use of specific
provisions with references to the overarching principles that bind the text
and its structure together.130 Justice Marshall had to answer questions
about the power of Congress and the power of the states in the absence of
any specific textual provision in the Constitution. He used a form of
penumbral reasoning similar to Justice Douglas's: "Though the literal text
of the Constitution provided no definitive answer ... Marshall formulated
a persuasive answer based on the whole structure of the Constitution, its
text, the interrelatedness of its provisions, and constitutional 'first
principles:"31
Penumbral reasoning can be thought of as a form of textualism,1 32 in
that it relies on the text and structure of the Constitution as the basis for
its inferences. And arguably, the Ninth Amendment sets the stage for
125 Denning & Reynolds, supra n. 17, at 1092.
126 Id.
127 Reynolds, supra n. 17, at 
1 3 3
5.
128 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
129 Denning & Reynolds, supra n. 17, at 1093. See also Reynolds, supra n. 17, at 1336-37. Marshall did not use the word
"penumbra" in his opinion, but, according to Denning and Reynolds, he did use a form of judicial reasoning that could also
be called "penumbral;' in that he relied on inferences based on the textual structure of the Constitution.
130 Denning & Reynolds, supra n. 17, at 1093.
131 Id.
132 For a discussion of the various forms of textualism in Griswold, including Douglas's "strong textualism;' see Anthony
Musante, Black and White: What Law and Literature Can Tell U~s About the Disparate Opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut,
85 Or. L. Rev. 853 (2006).
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penumbral reasoning when it states that the "enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people' 133 Without the type of reasoning-by-inter-
polation that characterizes penumbral reasoning, it would be difficult to
avoid "denying or disparaging" rights that the Constitution does not
explicitly enumerate.
13 4
So why the controversy regarding Griswold? Part of the answer lies in
the ideological reactions, noted above, both to the idea of a right to
privacy as an unenumerated Constitutional right and to the Court's move
toward "results-oriented jurisprudence" As a part of these political
reactions, the metaphorical nature of the reasoning in Griswold also came
under fire. But the metaphorical reasoning of the case is conceptually
sound, although Justice Douglas may have skewed his expression of it.
And the underlying conceptual structure of the penumbra metaphor in
Griswold is the same as that of other judicial instances of penumbral
reasoning. The penumbral reasoning in Griswold has a basis that is both
conceptual and historical. Its conceptual basis lies in the fact that it is an
instance of a spatial metaphor, and its historical basis lies in its judicial
usage in constitutional law.
A. Penumbra as a Spatial Metaphor
Some of our most fundamental concepts are organized as spatial
metaphors, 135 and, as other authors have pointed out, the judicial use of
penumbra is one of them.136 Spatial metaphors, like all conceptual
metaphors, possess an inherent systematicity. 13 7 For example, the spatial
metaphor HAPPY IS UP 13 8 reflects a coherent system that metaphorically
organizes part of the way in which we think about the emotion of
happiness. Individual expressions of this metaphor, such as "I'm feeling
up;' "my spirits rose;' or "you're in high spirits," are part of a coherent
metaphorical system, rather than isolated or random statements. In
addition, an external systematicity exists among the various spatial
metaphors. So the spatial metaphor GOOD IS UP gives UP an orientation to
general well-being, and HAPPY IS UP is in turn externally coherent with this
133 U.S. Const. amend. IX. See also Reynolds, supra n. 17, at 1
3 4
5.
134 Reynolds, supra n. 17, at 1345.
135 See Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors, supra n. 18, at 17.
136 See Henly, supra n. 21, at 83 (identifying Justice Douglas's penumbra metaphor as the "most important and puzzling
spatial metaphor in American constitutional law").
137 See id.
138 Remember that, in contemporary metaphor theory, this kind of phrasing names the mapping of a source domain ("up")
onto a target domain ("HAPPY"). See Lakoff, Theory, supra n. 18, at 207.
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second metaphor GOOD IS up.139 Furthermore, this coherence is deep-
seated, because the two spatial metaphors are rooted in our physical and
cultural experience. They are not random, nor is the coherence of their
metaphorical systematicity.
Spatial metaphors are, in turn, an instance of an even more funda-
mental metaphorical system-that of container metaphors. 140 This
relationship becomes important for understanding penumbral reasoning.
Container metaphors are fundamental because they derive, in the most
basic sense, from our physical experience of the world. 141 As physical
beings, we experience the world as outside of us, beyond the boundaries of
our skin. In this sense, each of us is a container, with a surface that bounds
the "container" that is our body and that defines what is "inside" of us and
"outside" of us.
The conceptual system of container metaphors relies upon
boundaries. In our experience of the rest of the world, we perceive
physical boundaries, but even when we don't-and, more importantly,
when we are conceptualizing in terms of container metaphors-we still
impose boundaries:
A clearing in the woods has something we can perceive as a natural
boundary-the fuzzy area where the trees more or less stop and the
clearing more or less begins. But even where there is no natural physical
boundary that can be viewed as defining a container, we impose
boundaries-marking off territory so that it has an inside and a
bounding surface-whether a wall, a fence, or an abstract line or plane.
There are few human instincts more basic than territoriality.
1 42
Many of our notions of law are container metaphors, expressed in
spatial terms. 143 When I teach metaphor in a law and literature course, I
ask the students to help me find examples of metaphorical expressions
about the law that reveal the underlying metaphor of LAW AS A TERRITORY
OR DEFINED SPACE. They have little trouble coming up with examples:
139 See Lakoff& Johnson, Metaphors, supra n. 18, at 18.
140 See id. at 29-32; Ritchie, supra n. 62, at 1003.
141 See Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors, supra n. 18, at 29.
142 Id.
143 See Ritchie, supra n. 62, at 1003. Burr Henly also notes that spatial metaphors in the law make it possible to visualize
change. "Doctrines can be extended, narrowed, expanded, and circumscribed. Branches are separated but not hermetically
sealed off Legal rules develop frontiers, cores, and cutting edges. Without splitting hairs, fine lines get drawn. Without using
protractors, lawyers are able to define spheres of influence:' Henly, supra n. 21, at 82.
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areas of the law / areas of law practice
"X"falls within that case / "X"falls within that statute
"X"falls within the four corners of the case
"X"falls within her rights
the case doesn't cover "X's" situation (a related metaphor)
the long arm of the law (that drags a defendant into its territory); the long
arm statute
standing / the complainant lacks standing (in the territory of the law)
jurisdiction -the area in which a court has power (more literally, where
the law is declared)
As these examples reveal, the concept of boundaries is central to
spatial metaphors regarding the law.
Steven Winter has written about the relationship between container
metaphors and the logical concept of categories, a concept essential not
only to rationalist notions of logic
144 but also to legal decision making.
14
The entailment of the container metaphor, that things have boundaries,
when applied conceptually to formal models for logic, leads to the
inference that logical categories have boundaries, ones that are well
defined. 146 In one of the originating statements of formal logic, a thing is
either P or not-P; a thing is either inside the category, or it is not. Winter
notes, however, that this standard logical use of categories can be overly
totalizing and limited by its all-or-nothing quality:
147
The conventional view treats the notion of a category as an a priori
conceptual structure that, consistent with the logic of P or not-P, is
homogenous in content .... But, it turns out, categories are both varied
in kind and complex in structure. On the standard view, categories are
descriptive, definitional, and rigidly bounded. The empirical evidence, in
contrast, presents a picture of categorization as an imaginative and
dynamic process that is flexible in application and elastic in scope.
1 48
The idea that categories are less rigidly defined accords with our own
physical experience of the world. For example, we understand the states of
day and night as categories. An event can occur "in" the day or "at" night.
144 See Winter, Clearing, supra n. 18, at 62. 147 Id. at 64.
145 See id. at 101. 148 Id. at 69.
146 See id. at 62.
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But our experience of these categories is that they lack rigidly defined
boundaries, and we even give names to the transitional period when we
"go" from one to the other: dawn and dusk. One could argue that the
concepts of dawn and dusk are simply new categories, but even if they are,
the need for them as categories indicates the slippage in the boundaries
between day and night. And these new categories do not really solve
anything, for the slippage continues-for example, more slippage occurs in
asking when night ends and dawn begins.
If, in our experience, not all categories have rigid boundaries, and if,
as Winter claims, the well-bounded logical categories that derive from the
CONTAINER metaphor do not always work, then how can the idea of cate-
gories be useful as a logical concept? The answer is that we employ more
than one type of structuring metaphor for logical categories. Winter, citing
Lakoff, points out that we also commonly employ what he calls "radial
categories"-categories that are more flexible and elastic. 149 "A radial
category consists of a central model or case with various extensions that,
though related to the central case in some fashion, nevertheless cannot be
generated by rule '15 0 Perhaps radial categories are easier to understand by
means of their underlying metaphorical schema: CENTER-PERIPHERY.15 1
Winter asks which is the better representative of the category
"bachelor": the Pope, James Bond, or Tarzan? 5 2 Technically, as unmarried
men, all three are bachelors. But under the CONTAINER metaphor, the Pope,
and perhaps even Tarzan, do not quite seem to fit inside the boundaries.
James Bond clearly does. Under the CENTER-PERIPHERY metaphorical
schema, however, the category of "bachelor" makes more sense, with
James Bond being near the center and the Pope more at the periphery. The
"reach" of the "bachelor" category is more dynamic, capable of expansion
or adjustment.
More recently, Mark Johnson suggested that the idea of radial cate-
gories, employing the CENTER-PERIPHERY metaphor, is important for law:
If a principle, rule, or law consists of a set of classically structured
concepts, then that law would apply in a certain clear fashion solely to
those situations where the defining conditions for the concepts were
satisfied in our experience. If "thou shalt not murder," and if you know
the necessary and sufficient conditions that define murder, then your
only problem in evaluating a proposed course of action is to determine
precisely whether it involves an act of murder. If a certain act manifests
149 Id. at 71 (citing Lakoff, Categories, supra n. 18, at 151 See id at 75 76.
79-114). 152 Id. at 85-86.
150 Id.
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the requisite properties that constitute murder, then it is prohibited,
period. This classical objectivist view of categories, if it were true, would
make law a neat little process of strict rule application. How a legal
concept might grow without completely redefining the concept, and how
legal judgment might change in a rational, stable manner, could never be
explained using this view.
153
Johnson proposes that we should, instead, think of most legal
concepts as having complex radial structures. Like all metaphorical
concepts, these concepts are not free-wheeling, but rather are grounded in
our shared experience) 5 4 Through their entailments, these concepts can
be applied to novel cases, and in some instances can even expand the
concept. But if legal concepts possess radial structures, they are not excep-
tional in doing so. "[M]any of our most basic concepts, from those for
simple objects like cups and beds, all the way to abstract concepts in
morality, politics, science, religion, and law, have complicated internal
radial structures... 155
The metaphorical use of penumbra by Justice Douglas and others
seems to implicitly acknowledge this complex structure of legal categories.
We think of law in spatial terms, a subsidiary of the logical categorization
that is so central to legal reasoning. Certain activities are protected, for
example, by lying "within" the First Amendment (association), the Fourth
Amendment (protection from search and seizure), or the Fifth
Amendment (freedom from forced surrender).1 6 Certain rights clearly lie
within the center. But not all the categories for rights are so precisely
defined or presented. For privacy, a right he was confident existed,
Douglas had to look in the metaphorical periphery. Douglas may have
expressed the concept in an incoherent fashion,15 7 as will be examined
below. But conceptually, his use of the metaphor makes sense and,
metaphorically, it is logical.158 It also has historical precedent in the U.S.
judicial system, including in the reasoning of the Supreme Court.
153 Johnson, supra n. 103, at 848. 158 As Steven Winter explains:
154 Id. at 852. Logic is not a truth about the world whose
validity is coincidentally supported by
155 Id. at 848 49. metaphor; the "truth" of logic is, rather, a
156 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. function of human cognitive processes. As a
product of human minds, logic is structured in
157 By "incoherent;' I mean that in spelling out the details
of the penumbra metaphor, his expression of these details just the same way that other human conceptsare structured that is, imagistically and
violates the underlying structure of the metaphor. metrically.
metaphorically.
Winter, Clearing, supra n. 18, at 58.
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B. Penumbra in Constitutional Law: Historical Usages
Judicial usage of the penumbra metaphor in U.S. courts goes back at least
as far as the nineteenth century.15 9 In Montgomery v. Bevans,160 ruling on a
claim to the property of a person who had disappeared and was presumed
dead, the court referred to the time that had passed as "the penumbra, or
death period, of seven years' 161 The ruling does not expound on the
metaphorical usage, however.
1 62
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes made the most prominent early uses of
penumbra as a metaphor.1 63 In each instance, his use of penumbra relied
upon a spatial metaphor for the underlying conceptual structure. He first
used the penumbra metaphor explicitly in a law review article, The Theory
of Torts, in 1873.164 Writing about the need to distinguish between two
lines of cases that were taking the law in opposite directions, 16 Holmes
recommended drawing a line at some point. "The distinction between the
groups [of cases], however, is philosophical, and it is better to have a line
drawn somewhere in the penumbra between darkness and light, than to
remain in uncertainty."16a The penumbral area between the two lines of
cases is spatial, its shadowy territory marked by the partial illumination
that exists between full light and the shadow of darkness.167 Although he
seems to prefer bright lines, Holmes resorted to the metaphorical
penumbra as a way of dealing with the slippage between those lines.
Once he was on the bench, Holmes invoked the penumbra metaphor
a number of times, beginning with a Massachusetts case in 1901. Here,
again, he acknowledged that the categories of the law, in this case consti-
tutional rules, lack boundaries that can be rigidly delineated:
Perhaps the reasoning of the cases has not always been as sound as the
instinct which directed the decisions. It may be that sometimes it would
have been as well not to attempt to make out that the judgment of the
159 Greely, supra n. 21, at 251.
160 17 F. Cas. 628 (1871).
161 Montgomery, 17 F. Cas. at 632.
162 One other 19th Century use of the word was clearly not metaphorical. In 1898, a federal court ruled on a case involving
a United States Marshal named Penumbra Kelly. See United States v. Kelly, 89 F. 946 (1898). See also Greely, supra n. 21, at
253 n. 10. This author cannot help but note that Kelly was, at the time, the United States Marshal for the District of Oregon,
a peripheral territory.
163 Henly traces the development of the metaphor by collecting and describing its use by Justice Holmes, Justice Benjamin
Cardozo, Justice Felix Frankfurter, Judge Learned Hand, Justice Douglas, and Prof. H.L.A. Hart. Henly, supra n. 21, at 83 92.
164 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. Rev. 652, 654 (1873), reprinted in 44 Harv. L. Rev. 773 (1931).
See also Henly, supra n. 21, at 83 84.
165 1 am compelled to point out the spatial metaphors that underlie this common way of talking about the law.
166 Holmes, supra n. 164, at 654, reprinted at 775.
167 See Henly, supra n. 21, at 84.
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court was consistent with constitutional rules, if such rules were to be
taken to have the exactness of mathematics. It may be that it would have
been better to say definitely that constitutional rules, like those of the
common law, end in a penumbra where the Legislature has a certain
freedom in fixing lines, as has been recognized with regard to the police
power.
168
Holmes also acknowledged that these areas of penumbral uncertainty
grant more freedom and flexibility to lawmakers.
169
While on the U.S. Supreme Court, Holmes continued his use of the
penumbra metaphor. Writing of the state boundaries of empowering juris-
dictions, he noted the desirability of drawing clear categorical lines. "If this
view be adopted we get rid of all questions of penumbra, of shadowy
marches where it is difficult to decide whether the business extends to
them. We have sharp lines drawn upon the fundamental consideration of
the jurisdiction originating the right."170 But Holmes also knew, and
acknowledged, that such lines were not always possible. For example, in
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin,17 1 Holmes wrote:
[W]hile I should not dream of asking where the line can be drawn, since
the great body of the law consists in drawing such lines, yet when you
realize that you are dealing with a matter of degree you must realize that
reasonable men may differ widely as to the place where the line should
fall .... But the law allows a penumbra to be embraced that goes beyond
the outline of its object in order that the object may be secured. 72
Here, again, Holmes made use of the penumbra as a spatial metaphor.
This time he uses it to acknowledge that, although statutes may circum-
scribe an outline within which they fall, they may also reach beyond that
outline into a penumbral area in order to secure their object. 173 Holmes's
use of the penumbra metaphor, and the accompanying jurisprudence, was
referred to after Schlesinger as his "penumbra doctrine."
17 4
Holmes's next two uses of the penumbra metaphor apply the spatial
metaphor to constitutional law. In 1928, Holmes noted the importance of
penumbral shading between extremes:
168 Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472,476-477 (1901). See also Henly, supra n. 21, at 84.
169 See Henly, supra n. 21, at 84.
170 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf 240 U.S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring). See also Henly, supra n. 21, at 85.
171 270 U.S. 230 (1926).
172 Schlesinger, 270 U.S. at 241 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Henly, supra n. 21, at 85.
173 See Henly, supra n. 21, at 85.
174 See id. at 85 (citing Black, The "Penumbra Doctrine" in Prohibition Enforcement, 27 I1. L. Rev. 511 (1933)).
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The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to
terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other.... When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more
obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our
government could not go on.
1 75
And in Olmstead v. United States,176 he suggested that certain
provisions of the Bill of Rights create a penumbra of protective rights:
While I do not deny it, I am not prepared to say that the penumbra of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant, although I fully
agree that Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a
law where those words import a policy that goes beyond them.
177
In this particular case, he was reluctant to extend the penumbral
protection of the Bill of Rights to the defendant, and so he decided the
case on other grounds. But he admitted that the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments contain penumbras that would cover other cases.
178
Holmes was not the only federal judge to use the penumbra
metaphor. 179 Learned Hand used the metaphor eleven times, primarily to
refer to the indistinct borders of words 180 or concepts. 181 Benjamin
Cardozo, who replaced Holmes on the Supreme Court, had used the
penumbra metaphor early in his career: "There is in all such controversies
a penumbra where rigid formulas must fail. No test more definite can then
be found than the discretion of the court, 'to be carefully and guardedly
exercised' in furtherance of justice ' 182 Once on the Supreme Court,
Cardozo used the metaphor at least three more times. For example, in
1937, he invoked the metaphor in a fashion very much like Holmes, as a
way of acknowledging that sharp categorical lines cannot always be drawn
and that an area of uncertainty exists where judges have discretion:
175 Springer v. Govt. of the Philip., 277 U.S. 189, 209 10 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Henly, supra n. 21, at 86.
176 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
177 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Henly, supra n. 21, at 87.
178 See Henly, supra n. 21, at 87.
179 See id. at 87-90; Greely, supra n. 21, at 256-59.
180 Commr. v. Ickelheimer, 132 E2d 660, 662 (1943) (Hand, J., dissenting).
181 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950). See also Greely, supra n. 21, at 256-58.
182 Norwegian Evangelical Free Church v. Milhauser, 252 N.Y. 186, 191 (1929) (internal citation omitted). Henly argues that
this use is not accidental, given the great influence that Holmes had over Cardozo. See Henly, supra n. 21, at 88.
PENUMBRAL THINKING REVISITED
The conception of the spending power advocated by Hamilton and
strongly reinforced by Story has prevailed over that of Madison, which
has not been lacking in adherents. Yet difficulties are left when the power
is conceded. The line must still be drawn between one welfare and
another, between particular and general. Where this shall be placed
cannot be known through a formula in advance of the event. There is a
middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at large.
183
For Cardozo, as for Holmes, the penumbra metaphor offered a way of
reasoning about the slippage that often occurs in rigid categorical
thinking.
Not only judges, but also legal commentators employed the penumbra
metaphor. Karl Llewellyn used the metaphor to point out that the edges of
the Constitution are not sharp but rather "penumbra-like ' '1 84 H. L. A. Hart
used the metaphor twice, both times in a manner that accords with the
conceptual metaphor of CENTER-PERIPHERY. 185 In Hart's usage, "[t]here are
penumbras of uncertainty, but also core areas where the distinctions are
clear.' 186 Henly notes that Hart's use of the penumbra metaphor in the late
1950s and early 1960s indicates how accepted the metaphor had
become.
1 87
Before Griswold, Douglas used the penumbra metaphor eight
times. 188 In six of these cases, he used penumbra as a way of expressing his
view that the outer reach of the law cannot be rigidly delineated. For
example, he wrote in 1956 that "[t]he problem lies in the penumbra of
Louisiana law, making all the more difficult a prediction as to what the
Louisiana courts would hold,"189 and in 1957 that "[tihe Labor
Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It
points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other
problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates ' 90 In a
third case, Douglas used the metaphor in a manner similar to Holmes's
183 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). See also Henly, supra n. 21, at 88.
184 Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 26-28 (1934).
185 See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 119 (1961); H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation ofLaw and Morals, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 593, 606-14 (1958).
186 Henly, supra n. 21, at 91.
187 See id.
188 See Federal Power Commn. v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 39 (1964); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 392 n. 5 (1961);
Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, 356 U.S. 309, 317 (1958); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957);
Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 97 (1957); General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 159, 169 (1956) (Douglas, J, dissenting);
General Comm. of Adjustment v. Missouri-K-T Rwy., 320 U.S. 323, 336 (1943); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 331
(1941) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
189 General Box Co., 351 U.S. at 169.
190 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.
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use of penumbra in Olmstead, as an area that is protective-here
protecting managerial practices from judicial scrutiny:191
Here it is plain that the stockholder and those who manage the corpo-
ration are completely and irrevocably opposed on a matter of corporate
practice and policy. A trial may demonstrate that the stockholder is
wrong and the management right. It may show a dispute that lies in the
penumbra of business judgment, unaffected by fraud.
92
In each of these cases, Douglas used the penumbra metaphor spatially and
as a way of referring to a peripheral area or region.193 His use of the
metaphor seems fixed by 1964, and the stage is set for Griswold. But in
finally using the penumbra metaphor in that case, he did so in a way that
he had already employed in prior cases, and his use followed several
decades of judicial usage.
C. Penumbra in Griswold v. Connecticut
Griswold v. Connecticut began with the arrest of Estelle T. Griswold, the
Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and
Dr. C. Lee Buxton, in 1961.194 Griswold and Buxton were arrested for
giving medical advice to married couples who wished to avoid
conception. 95 Both were found guilty of violating two Connecticut
statutes, one prohibiting the use of "any drug, medicinal article, or
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception;"1 96 and the other
punishing any person who assists another person in committing an
offense.1 97 The judgments against them were affirmed by Connecticut's
Appellate Division of the Circuit Court and by its Supreme Court of
Errors.1 98 Griswold and Buxton appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which granted them standing to raise the constitutional rights of the
married people with whom they had a professional relationship. 99
At the Supreme Court, the appellants offered three arguments for
overturning their convictions. First, they argued that the statutes violated
the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving them of their right to liberty and
property without due process of law.200 Second, they argued that the
statutes violated due process as an unwarranted invasion of privacy.20 1
191 See Henly, supra n. 21, at 91. 196 Id.
192 Smith, 354 U.S. at 97. 197 Id.
193 See Greely, supra n. 21, at 260. 198 Id.
194 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. 199 Id. at 481.
195 Id. 200 See Musante, supra n. 132, at 880.
201 See id.
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And third, they argued that the statutes violated the First Amendment.2 2
Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court, found the second argument
convincing.20 3 After discussing a line of cases in which the Court had
previously found rights not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or the
Bill of Rights-for example, the right of association,20 4 Douglas then made
his well-known statement regarding a right to privacy:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance .... Various guarantees create zones of
privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohi-
bition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures" The Fifth Amendment in its Self- Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force him to surrender to his detriment.
205
Noting that the Constitution did not explicitly mention a right to privacy,
Douglas used a combination of case precedent, analogy, and inferential
reasoning-penumbral reasoning-to assert that one existed.
Douglas's use of penumbral reasoning draws some attention to the
concept of "penumbra" itself, Greely remarks that "penumbra" originates
with Johannes Kepler, who invented the term in 1604 from the Latin
words paene ("almost") and umbra ("shadow"). 206 Kepler had observed
that during full lunar eclipses the earth produced a sharply defined deep
shadow, or umbra, but that a less distinct shading surrounded the
umbra-the penumbra.20 7 Recent definitions of "penumbra" embody this
eclipse configuration: "the partially shaded outer region of a shadow
(contrasted with the umbra) when the light comes from a source of some
size "'20 8 or "the partially shaded outer region of the shadow cast by an
opaque object '
20 9
Douglas's use seems to rely on an eclipse configuration for the central
spatial metaphor of his argument, the variant of the container metaphor
202 See id. 207 Id. The less distinct shading produced the phenomenon
203 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. of a partial lunar eclipse, when the moon was not fully in the
center of the earth's shadow. Id.
204 See id. at 482-83.
208 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, supra n. 24,
205 Id. at 484. at 2152.
206 Greely, supra n. 21, at 252. 209 The New OxfindAmerican Dictionary 1267 (Elizabeth
J. Jewell & Frank Abate eds., Oxford U. Press 2001).
JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS / VOLUME 7 / 2010
known as CENTER-PERIPHERY. Not finding a right to privacy "within" the
center of the Constitution or Bill of Rights, he has to look to the
penumbral area, the shading, formed by specific guarantees. There, he
finds it: the penumbra of the First Amendment, for example, "contains" a
right of association. This right is spatial-a "zone of privacy." Other
Amendments create other zones of privacy as well. Consistent with the
underlying metaphor, Douglas notes that the privacy rights derived from
the First Amendment are "peripheral rights' 210 meaning that they radiate
from the core rights of the Amendment. "Penumbra" seems synonymous
with "peripheral" A few sentences later, Douglas restates that "the First
Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from govern-
mental intrusion' 21  Two pages later, he summarizes the spatial metaphor:
"The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees 212
The entailment of Douglas's penumbra metaphor is consistent with
the historical usage of that entailment by prior federal and Supreme Court
judges, as well as with Douglas's own prior usage. The categories of the
law, whether those formed by legal rules or those consisting of constitu-
tional provisions or constitutional protections, are not always sharply
delineated. In the penumbral area of less certainty, on the periphery, legal
decision makers have more discretion. Stephen Kanter calls the penumbra
metaphor used by Douglas the "Basic Core/Penumbra Model" 213 and finds
it unexceptional:
The central idea is that each textually explicit core right also has a
protective shell, and a set of corollary or derivative rights. The Court
describes these necessarily implied or peripheral rights as penumbras;
that is, each core right casts a shadow or has a "penumbra" that contains
the implied rights. This is a well- established approach to constitutional
text, and hardly a novel or inadmissible proposition conjured out of the
aether by Justice Douglas.
214
Kanter also observes that the Court is acting "responsibly and legitimately
when it finds penumbral rights that flow naturally from one of the
textually explicit core rights... ,,215
It would seem, then, that the penumbral reasoning in Griswold could
be readily accepted. Many have argued for its conceptual integrity,
whether in terms of metaphorical reasoning or Supreme Court
210 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. 213 Kanter, supra n. 13, at 627.
211 Id. 214 Id. at 626.
212 Id. at 485. 215 Id. at 630.
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jurisprudence,2 16 and it has roots in historical usage. But the penumbral
reasoning in Griswold has not been fully accepted. One reason has to do
with the larger ideological debate that surrounded the right to privacy.
2 17
Another has to do with a general distrust of metaphor as a deviant form of
expression. Douglas's own colleagues evince some of this distrust. Justice
Harlan, who was better convinced by the Fourteenth Amendment due
process argument, rejects the metaphorical emanations that Douglas saw:
"While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their
radiations"2 18 Harlan, however, relies on his own underlying spatial
metaphor when summarizing his concurrence, using "infringement": "the
proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut
statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.2.1. 9 And in rejecting the radiations, he invokes his own,
somewhat comical, metaphor for the stability of the Due Process Clause:
"[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my
opinion, on its own bottom"220 Justice Black, dissenting, implicitly concep-
tualizes privacy in spatial terms with his use of the verb "invade": "I like my
privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit
that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific
constitutional provision'221 Like Harlan, he rejects emanations from those
provisions, and so presumably his interest in a right to privacy would
originate elsewhere. Justice Stewart, as mentioned at the beginning of this
article, seemingly rejects metaphors altogether.222
A third reason for Griswold's difficulty, however, may have to do with
Douglas's own expression of the penumbra metaphor. The underlying
spatial metaphor that he invokes seems conceptually sound, but his
expression of it violates the structure of the underlying concept. In fact, it
violates the rules of metaphorical coherence. Lakoff and Johnson write
that metaphors have the power to define reality through "a coherent
216 See Luban, supra n. 17, at 7.
217 See supra nn. 122-23 and accompanying text.
218 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
219 Id. (emphasis added). "Infringe" means "to break into" or "to encroach upon" that is, a breaking into or encroachment
onto a territory or space; from the Latin IN +frangere, to break. See The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, supra n. 24,
at 1365.
220 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
221 Id. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting). Henly pointed out that even though Justice Black objected to the emanation view from
which the right of privacy emerged, Justice Black nonetheless viewed the First Amendment in spatial terms, referring to his
not being able "to stretch" it to cover the defendants' conduct. See Henly, supra n. 21, at 92-93.
222 See supra n. 15 and accompanying text.
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network of entailments that highlight some features... and hide others '223
In his expression of the entailment of the penumbra metaphor, Douglas
violates this coherence in two ways. First, he fails to render the
entailments of the penumbra metaphor coherently. And second, he applies
the metaphor (to his target domain-constitutional rights) in a way that
renders it inconsistent with another underlying metaphor that he invokes
in his expression, IDEAS ARE LIGHT SOURCES.
2 24
First, the problems with Douglas's expression of the entailment. To
repeat a quote, Douglas wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance."22s To begin with, if the specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras (a peripheral region), then those specific
guarantees should lie in the umbra, or shaded portion (the core region
next to which the penumbra is peripheral). But the shaded portion could
not at the same time have emanations. The emanations would more
properly come from the light source. Others have noted this problem:
"Penumbras-areas of half light and half shadow-are not caused by the
areas of full light which they abut. Rather the light of penumbras and the
light of areas of full illumination have the same source."
226
I teach Griswold as a part of a metaphor component in one of my
courses. My students regularly conclude that if the right to privacy is
created by emanations from the light source (the specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights), then the right to privacy more properly lies, not in the
penumbra, but in the corona (the outermost part of a luminous body, such
as the sun). 227 That is, the right to privacy, as an emanation from light,
should lie in the light, not in the dark. In attempting to spell out the
entailment by referring to the penumbra as being created by emanations
from the same body that has the penumbras, Douglas has violated the
spatial systematicity of the metaphor.
By the time Douglas was using the penumbra metaphor, it appears to
have been fully conventionalized;2 2 8 so he would not have chosen a corona
metaphor, which lacked a tradition of usage and violated the convention.
He also may not have been aware that he was violating the underlying
image-schema; he would not, at that time, have had this technical
223 Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors, supra n. 18, at 157-58.
224 See Winter, Clearing, supra n. 18, at 173. Winter also comments directly on the DIAS ARi IGH'T SOIURCI S metaphor in
Transcendental Nonsense, supra n. 18, at 1172 n. 212.
225 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
226 Mohr, supra n. 22, at 62 (emphasis in original). See also Luban, supra n. 17, at 32.
227 Henly also notes this. See Henly, supra n. 21, at 99.
228 Greely calls the metaphor "dead" by the time Douglas used it. Greely, supra n. 21, at 260.
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language for such a thing. Nevertheless, that image-schema seems to be
very much present, and violated, for those who have thought about the
metaphor.
In discussing the metaphor in class (and setting aside the problem of
the corona), I also ask students to diagram the light-source, the blocking
body (the counterpart to the moon, e.g., in a solar eclipse), and the umbra
and penumbra, assigning the appropriate terms to the elements of the
eclipse.229 Although they can almost always come up with a diagram, the
students also admit that their diagrams do not seem to work (again,
setting aside the problem that Douglas's emanations have their own
penumbra). The following are representative of diagrams that come the
closest to working.
LIGHT-SOURCE >> BLOCKING BODY >> PENUMBRA/UMBRA
specific guarantees Connecticut statutes right to privacy/
violation of the statutes
Bill of Rights government right to privacy/
government intrusion
Although these schemas fill in the blanks for the penumbra image,
they still fail to represent Douglas's expression of the metaphor, because
these schemas necessarily locate the right to privacy on the opposite side
from its source, in the Bill of Rights or its specific guarantees. If the right
to privacy is a penumbral right in the sense of a right peripheral to the
core rights, then it should be located on the left side of the diagram, next
to the region of those core rights. Also, as a right, privacy should be
located affirmatively, next to other rights-and not next to the negative
entities (violation of the statutes, government intrusion) located in the
diagrams above.2 30 These types of problems always arise when my
students and I discuss the diagrams.
Second, Douglas's metaphorical expression violates not only the
metaphor's internal systematicity, but also its external coherence with
another metaphor. This occurs because, by adding "emanations" to his
expression of the entailment, Douglas has added a second metaphorical
scheme: IDEAS ARE LIGHT SOURCES.2 3 1 This is a common metaphorical
scheme, and it makes perfect sense for Douglas to use it. In his entailment,
the ideas, specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, are light sources, and
229 Others have tried to diagram the penumbra image-schema as well. See Henly, supra n. 21, at 96-99; Kanter, supra n. 13,
at 640 711.
230 My students almost always attach a negative entity to the umbra, or deep shadow, for I believe cultural reasons, as
noted in the next paragraph.
231 See Winter, Clearing, supra n. 18, at 173; Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors, supra n. 18, at 48.
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thus they have emanations, resulting in the right to privacy. The right to
privacy is itself another idea, and one that we associate with light. The
problem lies with the cultural entailment of IDEAS ARE LIGHT SOURCES. Light
is good, and darkness and shadow are not. In addition, we "find" things in
the light, but we do not find things in darkness. So, if in Douglas's telling,
the right to privacy lies in the penumbral shading, this location violates the
entailment of his second metaphorical schema. We would expect to find
the object of his inquiry, the right to privacy, in the light, not in the
shade.
23 2
Douglas employed a metaphor that had become conventionalized and
that could have worked, conceptually, for his argument. But his effort to
spell out the entailment of the metaphor made it confusing and, more
importantly, violated both its internal and external coherence-its system-
aticity. To go back to an earlier part of this article, metaphors are powerful
conceptual devices, but they work most effectively when they rely upon
correspondences between our knowledge of the features of the source
domain that are being highlighted and our knowledge of typical features of
the target domain. 233 In the entailment of the penumbra metaphor in
Griswold, as spelled out by Douglas, these correspondences confuse at
best or, worse, fail to persuade. Additionally, when metaphors become
conventionalized, they become even more powerful because they are
unconscious and seem innate to our understanding of things. Douglas,
however, made the entailment of his penumbra metaphor conscious,
invoked a second conceptual metaphor, but then was unable to express the
entailment in a way that respected the underlying metaphorical
coherence.
Conclusion
Douglas's penumbra metaphor in Griswold is a metaphor that should have
worked, but for many it did not. Somewhere between "should have" and
"did not" lies a lesson in the use of metaphor in legal argument. First of all,
the "should have'
Metaphors are not only important to legal thinking, they are
commonplace-not just as the "dress" of legal thought but also as the
"stuff" of it. To take umbrage23 4 at Douglas's use of a metaphor in a judicial
232 Greely also observes that shadows and darkness are "unfortunate connotations for affirmative rights" Greely, supra n. 21,
at 251.
233 See Lakoff & Turner, supra n. 18, at 39.
234 "Umbrage": originally shade, or shadow; then a shadowy appearance; then suspicion; then, from the early seventeenth
century, displeasure or offence. See The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, supra n. 24, at 3450.
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opinion is to fail to recognize that, at a fundamental conceptual level, all
judicial thinking relies on metaphors in some fashion and that often these
metaphors rise to a kind of expression that consciously guides the course
of the law. Think of the "marketplace of ideas:' the "wall of separation"
between church and state, or the "chilling effect" on constitutional
freedoms.235 These are simply the overt examples. In much more funda-
mental and unconscious ways, given how deeply they are woven into both
our thought and our language, metaphors help to create the terms for legal
argument.
Second, metaphorical usages can also become conventionalized, and
in that way become a part of legal thinking and legal argumentation. By
the time of Griswold, the penumbra metaphor seems to have been
generally accepted and useful. Both federal judges and legal scholars
employed it. These conventionalized metaphorical usages become
important because, over time and with continued use, they acquire a
history of meaning. Metaphorical usages, like any other linguistic usage,
achieve a stability and, through their conventionality, become a part of our
ways of thinking.
And finally, metaphors can allow the law to change and evolve over
time. Johnson asks, "[H]ow can law preserve its integrity over time, while
managing to address the newly emerging circumstances that continually
arise throughout our history?"23 6 One answer is through metaphoric
reasoning and its capability for allowing innovative and imaginative
thought. But, in response to those who might fear it or regard it as deviant,
metaphoric reasoning is not uncontrolled and subjective. On the contrary,
it is highly constrained-both by its internal systematicity and coherence
and by the social contexts in which the meaning of its systems of corre-
spondences is grounded.237 The penumbra metaphor, in its historical
usage, allowed some flexibility to certain legal categories. But the very fact
that it has been controversial in Griswold, where its usage was skewed,
demonstrates how constrained metaphors actually are.
Now for the "did not.' A group of critics objects to Douglas's
penumbra metaphor.2 3 8 Metaphor, given its long treatment as being
viewed as a figure of speech only or as being deviant, takes yet another
beating. I suspect that in many instances, however, these objections are
motivated, not by Douglas's metaphor, but by his expression of the
235 For a discussion of these judicial metaphors and others, see Bosmajian, supra n. 20.
236 Johnson, supra n. 18, at 845.
237 See Winter, Re-Embodying, supra n. 18, at 897.
238 1 will set aside the group whose objections to Griswold rest primarily on ideological grounds.
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metaphor.23 9 Douglas made an unfortunate choice when he spelled out the
entailment of his penumbra metaphor. Rather than elucidating what he
meant, Douglas made it more confusing. The more closely one reads his
metaphorical expression, the more puzzling its details become. Even
worse, Douglas's effort to elaborate on the entailment violated hidden
"rules" of metaphorical coherence-both internal and external. The
metaphor does not appear to work. But what fails, in my view, is his
expression of the metaphor, not the underlying metaphor-itself a
common instance of one kind of container metaphor. Griswold's critics
have not, to my knowledge, made that distinction.
Here, then, lies another lesson on the use of metaphor in legal
argument-a lesson that goes back to Aristotle. Whether in law, poetry, or
anywhere else, the expression of a metaphor must be done appropriately.
That appropriate expression does not mean merely following stylistic
rules, but rather expressing the metaphor in a way that conveys its corre-
spondences, or mappings, coherently. If metaphors, conceptually, are
constrained by their own systematicity, then the expression of those
metaphors must in turn reveal, not muddle, that systematicity. It is not
that metaphors are figures of speech and, like any poetic device, must be
used cautiously and with restraint. Rather, metaphors, and their
expression, can be powerful and persuasive, and by virtue of those features
they must be expressed carefully.
Regarding metaphors in the law, as elsewhere, the challenge is not
whether to use them, but rather how to understand their rich and complex
nature. Metaphors are central to legal thinking, and, by adding flexibility,
they help law accommodate complexity and change in human social expe-
rience. Unfortunately, for some, metaphoric thinking seems to violate the
formal constraints of legal argument. 240 To believe this, however, is to fail
to understand how metaphors work, including the workings of their
internal structures and constraints. Lawyers and legal writers-those who
construct arguments in the law-would benefit from a fuller under-
standing:
[W]e need to understand first, that human rationality is not linear and
criterial to begin with, but imaginative and adaptive (that is, involving
metaphor, image-schemas, metonymies, and radial categories); second,
that imaginative thought (including metaphor) is systematic and regular
rather than arbitrary and unconstrained; and third, that innovation
(whether via metaphor or otherwise) is itself a contingent and, therefore,
239 See supra nn. 223-33 and accompanying text.
240 See Winter, Re-Embodying, supra n. 18, at 872.
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highly constrained phenomenon. Legal metaphor presents neither the
problems perceived by the realists nor those feared by conventional
scholars.
241
Thus understood, the realm of metaphor belongs not just to the poets, and
not just to the scholars, but-through the law and the law's central place in
human social and political life-to everyone.
241 Id.

